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ABSTRACT 
We analyze the impediments to inter-firm contractual relations, existing formal and informal 
ways of getting around them, especially the role of reputation and trust in mitigating the 
conflict of interest between the firms. We study it in the context of Indian IT industry. 
Contract design is specified as a function of reputation (age, repeated contracts and quality 
certification), asset specificity, complexity and uncertainty. We test the likelihood of 
observing Time & Material contract, a better propertied contract in the face of uncertainty. 
Empirical evidence conforms the propositions posited. Reputed firms tend to get highly 
complicated and uncertain projects. Asset specific investments do not seem to have any 
implication on contract type and complexity. The results broadly hint that the firms reckon 
more on creating an understanding through formal quality certifications to solve pre-
contractual adverse selection problems and repeated contracting to solve the problems of 
behavioral uncertainties rather than relying on the court.   
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I. Introduction:  
New Institutional Economics, particularly the tools of Transaction Cost Economics help 
unravel the economic rationale behind the inter-firm relations, among other organizational 
decisions. Inter-firm relations are determined by reconciling the relative cost of transacting 
within the firm, using the market and a hybrid mix of contractual relations. They adhere not 
only to technology but also to the available organizational modes resulting from the 
interaction of transactional characteristics and the external environment
1
.  
We, here, make an attempt to understand the nature of inter-firm relations in the Information 
Technology (IT) sector in India. We have chosen the IT sector for its uniqueness in terms of 
the kind of products it produces and services it renders. Large-scale vertical integration is 
uneconomical as the industry renders services that are non-core to the buyers. Moreover the 
spot markets cannot coordinate these transactions, as the production requires asset specific 
investments and also uncertainty and complexity are pervasive. Thus, contracts perform a 
vital role in Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) and Information Technology Enabled 
Services (ITES) outsourcing. In this context we test for the determinants of contract design.  
The fountainhead of inefficiency in outsourcing relationships is the difficulty in providing 
incentives and identifying the capabilities of the agents. Finding a supplier entails both ex 
ante screening and ex post adaptation costs. In spite of these hazards, we witness a deluge of 
outsourcing deals flowing into developing countries, where there are enormous socio-cultural 
and legal uncertainties. To safeguard against opportunistic behavior, firms in the industry opt 
for specific contractual choices that could abate the expected total cost of consummating the 
transactions. The contractual choice that firms adopt to shield against these hazards differs 
with the nature of the firms, nature of the project and quality of institutions such as contract 
law regimes and enforcement mechanisms (Williamson, 1979). We posit that the agents 
would decide upon a particular type and level of complexity of contract contingent on the 
characteristics of the agents, project characteristics and external environment.  
To carry out this empirical study we have collected data on contractual terms and conditions, 
project and agent characteristics from senior project managers from the firms in Technopark, 
Thiruvananthapuram, using both structured and semi-structured questionnaires. We have 
                                                 
1
  Transactional characteristics encompass frequency, complexity, uncertainty, idiosyncratic investments 
and asymmetric information involved in the transaction, while the external environment includes legal 
mechanism, enforceability of contracts and thinness of the market. 
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selected cases concerning complex transactions for which a close relationship between 
partners is necessary over a considerable period of time. Some firms have developed long-
term supply relations with their clients; others have spent considerable time and money 
customizing formal contracts.  While some appear to have done both.  Using this variation in 
the structure of outsourcing contracts, we empirically test the relationship between contract 
design and its determinants.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 lists the determinants of contracts, 
and the kind of contractual problems prevalent in the IT industry.  We also derive testable 
propositions in this section. Section 3 analyzes the survey data to see if the empirical 
evidence corroborates the assertion put forward at the onset.  In conclusion, we explore 
possible extensions. 
II 
Determinants of Contract Design: 
There are three major exchange hazards put forward by Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) 
that necessitate contractual safeguards, namely asset specificity in investment, complexity in 
measuring effort and uncertainty (Williamson, 1979). Asset-specificity is considered to play 
the lead role in influencing organizational choice. Asset specific investments
2
 generate quasi-
rent over and above the next best alternative use. When production requires massive 
idiosyncratic investments, some sort of assurance by both the parties to comply with the 
contractual agreement is indispensable. Through threats of termination of the relationship or 
hold up, one or both contractual parties may seek to appropriate an undue share in the quasi-
rent from these specialized investments (Klein, 1988). The optimal investment will be 
realized only if those relationship specific investments are protected by a formal contract. 
Complexity in measuring the efforts may give wrong incentives to the agent to limit their 
efforts towards fulfilling the contracted obligations (Monteverde and Teece, 1982).  
Specifying a few standard clauses of conduct like regular meetings, disclosure of documents 
and incentives for better performance can overcome the problem. Complex contracts that 
include the above-mentioned contractual clauses obviate unexpected behavioral twists by 
                                                 
2
  Asset specific investments are specific to a project or a line of production and therefore cannot be 
profitably redeployed in alternative uses. For example man-hours sunk in developing software for a buyer that 
cannot be sold to others is what is referred as asset specific. It is also referred as idiosyncratic investment.   
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providing a straightjacket of obligations to perform. Uncertainty is of two types: behavioral 
and quality uncertainty and uncertainty of business environment (Nooteboom, 1999). 
Complex contracts, by specifying the clauses and procedures of conduct facilitate 
negotiations that arise from technological and behavioral uncertainties.  
In sum, the exchange hazards discussed above encourage more complex contracts, which 
check behaviors that could jeopardize the performance of a buyer-supplier relationship. 
Empirical works in TCE (Joskow, 1988; Klein, Crawford, and Alchian, 1978; Masten, 1996) 
corroborate the predicted relationship: 
Proposition 1: Increase in exchange hazards such as asset specificity, complexity and 
uncertainty of the project encourages more complex contracts.   
Asset specificity, complexity and uncertainty necessitate a strong contractual safeguard.  On 
the other hand, when the project is subjected to uncertainty, a complex contract rendering 
straightjacket of obligations may be sub-optimal in some of the contingencies, thus, leave the 
relationship inefficient. As writing a more complete contract is prohibitively costly, there is a 
trade-off between writing one such contract with high costs and rigidities associated with it 
on the one hand, and an incomplete contract and a high expected cost of dispute resolution on 
the other. Economizing on the cost of contracting involves identifying capabilities (e.g. 
Nelson & Winter, 1982; Nooteboom, 1999) and rendering incentives to fulfill contractual 
obligations (e.g. Williamson, 1985). In technical terms, they are known as the problems of 
adverse selection and moral hazard, respectively.  
In the absence of full information, the trading parties to identify capabilities and incentivize 
each other have to incur some amount of real expenditure. Differentiating the unscrupulous 
players from the more credible ones and conferring her with incentivized contract is costly 
and at times perilous. Number of devises employed by the agents to achieve this purpose such 
as making trusted relationship, quality certification etc, have been identified in the literature.   
Many scholars have observed that the governance of inter-organizational exchanges involves 
more than formal contracts (Dyer & Singh, 1998). The critics argue that TEC, being skeptical 
about “trust” as a safeguard, over-emphasizes opportunism and the need for integration or 
strong contractual safeguards. Trust economizes on search costs and the costs of drafting and 
monitoring the contracts by lowering the fear of opportunism. It gives more flexibility to the 
relation as it does not specify rigid contractual obligations and therefore, facilitates 
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adaptation to unforeseeable events (Poppo, 2002). Good reputation sets the floor for mutual 
trust, helps identify scrupulous partners and mitigates the conflict of interest
3
. A good repute 
can be gained through personal characteristics such as family, kinship, religion or through 
institutional measures like quality certification, producer associations or it could even be 
gained from repeated interaction and understanding developed over a period of time.  
Proposition 2: Good reputation reduces the cost of writing complex contracts. 
In line with Banerjee et al (2000) and Arora et al (1999) we take quality certification
4
 as a 
measure of reputation. Quality certification is a signal that the agent sends to his potential 
clients about his “type”, which, apart from reducing the client’s search cost, triggers the 
negotiation for remuneration to his “type” of agents. Thus, quality certification can be taken 
as a device serving the purpose of identifying technologically capable partners.  
In the long run age serves the function of reputation as only credible players remain in the 
market. The duration of time that the parties have worked together – termed as pre-relation – 
helps the parties develop some relational norms and understanding (Macneil, 1978) of 
sharing the risks and benefits of the relation. Thus repeated contracts assuring behavioral 
credibility and technological capabilities measured by number of years and projects worked 
till date are taken as a measure of reputation. 
The other typical problem in inter-firm relations is to decide on the allocation of risk among 
the agents and distribution of gains from trade. These interdependent problems influence the 
contract type as the supplier expects a higher share of return if he were to bear a huge portion 
of the risk associated. Whereas the typical case would turn out to be where the supplier is a 
small firm, and therefore likely to be risk averse and would pay a premium to pass the risk to 
the buyer. Given the complexity and uncertainties associated with the projects, small firms 
would like to get a T&M contract rather than a fixed-price contract. Time and Material 
                                                 
3
  The conventional wisdom of reputation enhancing commitment has its theoretical foundation in the 
game theoretic approach to reputation effects pioneered by Kreps and Wison (1989). Reputation effects are 
argued to enhance long-run pay offs even upto the first best level and in the short run leave the agents at least as 
well-off as she would be in the complete absence of external incentives. 
4
  There are verities of quality certifications available for a IS outsourcing firm such as ISO 9000:2000, 
Capability Maturity Model (CMM), People Capability Maturity Model (PCMM) emphasizing the product, 
process quality and labor quality, respectively. But they all generate some information about the service 
provider, thus serve the purpose of a signaling device. So we do not treat quality certificates differently as they 
are assumed to serve the same purpose as far as the problem under consideration in concerned.   
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(T&M) contracts have excellent adaptability
5
, but it does not check the problem of moral 
hazard, whereas a fixed-price
6
 contract is rigid enough to check the problem but places the 
entire risk on the supplier, which may not conducive for trade when the project is complex 
and highly uncertain from supplier’s point of view.  
We propose that quality certification is necessary as a signal to separate high ability firms 
from the low ability firms, but it is not sufficient to identify between the scrupulous and non-
scrupulous players. Thus, a Time and Material (T&M) contract that exposes the client to 
moral hazard problems, implores other reputation measures to identify the conscientious 
partner and reward him/her with the contract that is less risky and adaptable to unexpected 
contingencies. The age of the firm and the duration of time it has worked with the client 
vouch for its credibility. Thus, quality certification would solve the problem of adverse 
selection, whereas the age and pre-relation guard against the moral hazard problem.  
Proposition 3: Quality certification is a necessary condition as it obviates pre-contractual 
quality uncertainty; whereas age and pre-relations are sufficient for 
obtaining a T&M contract as they assure good conduct of the firm.   
III 
Empirical Analysis:  
We examine the survey data to appreciate how well the theoretical propositions posited 
capture the real world hazards involved in inter-firm relations. We have first looked into the 
descriptive evidence from the data obtained about 48 contracts from the firms in Technopark, 
Thiruvanthapuram, to identify the nature of the agents, projects and the contracts they device.  
a) Firm Characteristics 
Firm characteristics, project characteristics and the external environment in which the firms 
operate are the determining factors of organizational choice. Firm characteristics encompass 
their technical capabilities, willingness to bear risk, etc. Descriptive evidence from the survey 
                                                 
5
  When there is a high probability that the project cannot be so accurately defined because of its 
complex nature and when disputes over the stipulations in the face of unexpected contingencies would be costly, 
Time and Material contract gives a breathing space for the parties to accommodate the unexpected events. 
6
  In a fixed-price contract, the product as well as the deadline for the project is decided. The contract 
may include penalty clauses for late delivery and for poor quality. In a Time-and-Materials contract, the client 
pays on a man-hour basis. Conventional wisdom is that fixed price contracts are best at low risk and cost plus as 
risk (complexity and uncertainty) increases. 
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is presented in table-I. Although the majority of the firms are fairly young – founded between 
1989 and 2002 – we have a considerable number of old firms also in the sample.  
Table I: Firm characteristics 
 Mean Mode Std. deviation  
Firm founded 1997.27 2000 3.79 
Subsidiary 0.35 0 0.48 
Legal Adviser 0.74 1 0.44 
Legal Review 0.89 1 0.31 
Had any employee with the client 0.19 0 0.39 
Quality Certification 0.33 0 0.48 
In our sample, business and medical transcriptions account for around 30% of total contracts 
observed. The rest includes legal transcriptions, networking, web designing and a range of 
varied sundry services. One of the notable features of Indian software industry is its seasoned 
human capital. Many of the local entrepreneurs have some work experience abroad and run 
the business with the help of established networks. However, this feature was observed in 
only 20% of the firms surveyed.  Having quality certification is the rule of the industry, 
however the majority of the firms in the sample seem to not have one. One of the interesting 
features to be noted from the sample data is that across the size, age and specialization, firms 
have their own legal advisers and more than 80% of them seek legal assistance in reviewing 
the contract. This shows the importance of contracts and the legal requirements for better 
relational management in Information Services (IS) outsourcing.  
b) Project Characteristics 
Project characteristics or transactional characteristics are the major concern in Transaction 
Cost Economics (TCE), as transactions are the unit of analysis. As mentioned there are three 
major exchange hazards: asset specificity, complexity in measuring effort, and uncertainty 
(Williamson, 1979).  
Asset specificity is defined as dedicated human assets, physical assets and organizational 
knowledge that could not be redeployed in alternative uses (Williamson, 1985).  Since human 
capital is a critical component of BPO and ITES outsourcing services, our measurement 
focuses primarily on specialized human assets, such as man-hours sunk in the project specific 
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to the client. Man-hours dedicated are highly varied
7
, but the mode being modest 400 man-
hours the average firm in the sample mostly gets short duration projects. 
Table II: Project characteristics 
 Mean Mode Std. Deviation 
Man-hours Spent 1874.46 400 3109.15 
Complexity* 1.17 3 0.78 
Uncertainty* 0.77 2 0.78 
Final output well defined* 1.52 2 0.55 
Note: * All are categorical variables labeled low (1), medium (2) and high (3). 
The contracts in the sample tend to be more complex in nature than uncertain. High 
complexity of the project indicates that the contracts would be extensive in coverage to make 
the deal unambiguous.  
To summarize, many of the firms in the sample are up and coming young ones and yet to get 
quality certification. However it is in their expertise, contra to our expectation the firms tend 
to get more complex projects if not uncertain ones. And also these projects do not have much 
in stake in terms of asset specific investment.  
c) Contract Characteristics 
A software project is a set of related tasks executed to achieve a specific objective in a given 
time limit by the service vendor. Software development project includes, as the popular text 
books in the subject suggest, the process of execution such as project specification, analysis, 
design, programming, test and implementation of the software and also a broad definition of 
the scope of the software intended to be produced etc (Pressman, 1997). A typical contract of 
an outsourcing relationship may involve contractual terms and stipulations on technicalities 
such as hardware to be used, a base software license, custom development, training, 
modifications, implementation, additional product components as they become available, 
upgrades, and annual support services. Irrespective of the type of the project, software service 
vendors have to give a project proposal specifying broadly an estimate of the cost and time 
requirements. 
                                                 
7
  High variation is due to medical and business transcription contracts that are continuous projects 
unlike the other one-shot software development projects. 
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Table III: Contract characteristics 
 Mean Mode Std. Deviation 
Total man-hour spent on contracting* 106.71 1
** 
123.39 
% Spent on contracting to total man-hour spent* 0.12 1
** 
0.11 
How detailed the contract was* 0.90 2 0.66 
No of pages in the contract 5.77 5 2.20 
Contract complexity* 0.58 2 0.50 
Compensation package (type)
# 
0.48 1 0.50 
Contract Execution: 
Approx. cost savings [%] 33.64 30 12.64 
Cost revision 4.06 0 6.58 
Man-days revised 6.63 0 10.26 
Approximate total revision  5.34 0 8.42 
Note:   * all are categorical variables labeled low (1), medium (2) and high (3). 
#  
(1) stands for Fixed-price contract, (2) for Time & Material contract and (3) for mix contracts. 
  
           ** Multiple modes exist. The smallest value is shown. 
Total expenditure on contracting encompasses man-hour spent on writing the proposal, 
specifications and drafting the contract. Expenditure on contracting ranging from zero to 400 
man-hours that constitute more than 10% of total man-hours spent in majority of the cases.  
Majority of the respondents felt that the contracts were, if not highly customized and 
complex, fairly complex and the average contract length were 5 pages. 
The common compensation packages in the industry are Fixed-price contract, Time and 
Material contract (cost plus), and a mix of these two. A fixed price contract places a huge risk 
on the supplier even though it gets rid of the nominal price uncertainty. But when relative 
market prices change, either of the parties may suffer pecuniary losses and face adaptation 
costs. It stringently expects a complete performance of the services in accordance with the 
contract terms at a price decided upon at the commencement of the project from the service 
provider. A T&M contract provides more space for the parties as it provides the materials 
required within the decided time span and the remuneration will be the cost spent on the 
project plus a pre-decided rate of profit. A mixed contract, as the name suggests, is a 
combination of Fixed-price and T&M contracts. We observed that the firms in the sample get 
more of Fixed-price contracts than T&M. 
Despite careful specifications, cost overruns
8
 are highly frequent in the industry as the 
projects are highly complex and have ever changing requirements. One of the major aims of 
contracting is to device a course of action to share the future costs and benefits of the relation. 
If at all any dispute arises, even though none in the sample reported any dispute, it will be of 
                                                 
8
  Overruns are the difference between the estimated and actual costs, requirements remaining the same. 
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sharing the overrun. In more than 50% of the cases the stipulations regarding either man-hour 
or costs were revised and the mean revision is about 5% of total expenditure
9
.  
d) Determinants of contract type and complexity 
Simple cross tabulation of contract type and complexity according to project characteristics 
(Table IV) confirms our proposition that highly uncertain and complex projects are protected 
by T&M contracts. A Fixed price contract would be adequate as simple and well defined 
projects like web designing pose little threat of unexpected future contingencies, and the 
terms and conditions, man-hours required could more or less be unambiguously stated at the 
commencement of the project itself. But, given uncertainty, complexity and huge investment 
(man-hour) at stake, a risk-averse agent would like to get a T&M contract that gives more 
space to try his/her hands on risky ventures.     
On the other hand, a T&M contract, from the client’s perspective, is perilous in the sense that 
it gives chances to the agent to shirk and blame it all to external disturbances. If only the 
agent is proved to be scrupulous, tested and trusted, the clients will settle for a T&M contract. 
Thus highly complex and uncertain projects are, as suggested in the literature, vastly reserved 
for reputed, well-established firms. Man-hours spent i.e. asset specific investments involved 
in the project, one of the determinants of inter-firm relations, does not seem to have any 
correlation with contract type and complexity. 
Table IV: Distribution of project characteristics across package type and complexity of contracts 
  Package Complexity of the contract 
 Fixed T&M Low High 
Uncertainty 
Low 14 
67% 
7 
33% 
15 
71.4% 
6 
28.6% 
High 11 
41% 
16 
59% 
5 
18.5% 
22 
81.5% 
Complexity 
Low 22 
76% 
7 
24% 
17 
58.6% 
12 
41.4% 
High 3 
16% 
16 
84% 
3 
15.8% 
16 
84.2% 
Man hour 
Low 18 
58% 
13 
42% 
17 
54.8% 
14 
45.2% 
High 7 
41% 
10 
59% 
3 
17.6% 
14 
82.4% 
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   What is more important in inter-firm relation is how these disputes over cost overruns are solved and 
ultimately who bears the cost. But many of our respondents were very reluctant to give any information on cost 
overrun sharing and disputes associated with it.    
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The second kind of classification of contracts is according to the complexity of the terms and 
stipulations used in the contracts. Writing a complex contract is costly, but given uncertainty 
and complexity of the projects, contracts have to be complex i.e. complete enough to include 
all the relevant conditions and rules of sharing unambiguously. As expected, higher the 
complexity of the project, higher the uncertainty and man-hour sunk in the relation, more 
complex the contracts tend to be.   
One of the informal ways of economizing on the cost of writing a complex contract, as 
outlined at the onset, is to develop some understanding with the partner or gather relevant 
information about the partner’s technological and behavioral traits. Creating and nurturing 
reputation is one among them. Reputation is measured in terms of their age, quality 
certifications, and previous relations with the client. 
Table V: Reputation variables 
 Mean Mode Std. Deviation 
Quality Certification* 0.33 0 0.48 
NASSCOM Membership* 0.08 0 0.28 
Age 1997 2000 0.38 
No. of previous projects 0.83 0 1.28 
How old your relationship [years] 0.63 0 0.79 
Note: * Both are categorical variables labeled no (1), yes (2) 
Given the nature of the transaction in the IT sector the major concern is quality of the 
services outsourced. Indian software companies relentlessly aspire to acquire the credibility 
in the international market through highest standards of quality assurance certifications like 
ISO 9000 and CMMs, thereby gaining an advantage as credible service providers. Our 
sample supports this, as older firms and firms with either ISO or CMM certification get 
highly complicated and uncertain projects wherein they often experiment as they proceed. 
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Table VI: Distribution by reputation across package type and complexity of contracts 
 Package Complexity of the contract 
Fixed T&M Low High 
Previous relations with the 
client 
New client 14 
70% 
6 
30% 
7 
35.0% 
13 
65.0% 
Old client 11 
39% 
17 
61% 
13 
46.4% 
15 
53.6% 
Quality Certification 
No certificate 22 
69% 
10 
31% 
17 
53.1% 
15 
46.9% 
ISO 9001/CMM 3 
19% 
13 
81% 
3 
18.8% 
13 
81.3% 
YEAR 
New 20 
80% 
5 
20% 
14 
56.0% 
11 
44.0% 
Old 5 
22% 
18 
78% 
6 
26.1% 
17 
73.9% 
We observed from the discussions with the senior project managers of these firms that they 
did place importance on quality certifications in communicating their quality to their clients 
as first hand information. It does seem to work, as the ISO/CMM firms get more of T&M 
contracts, although our data do not show that ISO/CMM firms manage to reduce the cost of 
writing complicated contracts. A mere quality certification assures the capabilities, but leaves 
the behavioral uncertainties untackled.  
Regression Results:  
As proposed in the literature we first estimated the determinants of contract complexity given 
the project characteristics such as man-hour spent, complexity and uncertainty. The results 
seem to corroborate that high asset specificity, complexity and uncertainty require highly pre-
emptive, complex contracts. Our results are consistent with the empirical findings of earlier 
studies (Masten, 1996). 
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Table VII: Determinants of contract complexity 
 
VARIABLES 
MODELS 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
CONSTANT 1.18* 0.91** 0.92** 0.98** 1.10* 1.21* 0.94** 
UNCRETAINTY 3.37* 2.64* 2.66* 2.73* 3.34* 2.92* 2.67* 
COMPLXITY 1.38 2.56* 2.69* 1.81** 0.83 2.78* 2.59* 
MAN HOUR 2.03** 1.03 0.93 1.64 1.15 1.18 1.12 
PRE-RELATION -1.67 - -0.82 - - - - 
YEAR 2.50** - - 1.68** - - - 
CETRIFICATE 1.02 - - - 2.55 - - 
RELATION*YEAR - - - - - -2.3 - 
RELATION* CETRIFICATE - - - - - - -0.55 
-2LL 33.38 39.92 38.89 37.12 37.75 38.35 39.81 
CS R
2 
0.48 0.41 0.42 0.44 0.44 0.43 0.41 
* significant at the 0.05 level or better. 
** significant at the 0.10 level. 
-2LL is -2 Log likelihood 
CS R
2
 is Cox & Snell R
2 
Our second proposition is that the firms with high reputation tend to economize on writing 
stringent, intricate contract vis-à-vis non-reputed firms. The results of our prime model hardly 
extend any support to our propositions put forward as age and certificate have wrong sign 
while all three of them including pre-relation turn out to be statistically insignificant even at 
higher levels of significance. Suspecting multicolinearity among the reputation variables we 
tried to quantify the impact of each of them separately on contract complexity given the 
project characteristics. Here too except pre-relation the other two have negative signs and 
none seem to be statistically significant. When we introduced the interactive term of 
reputation variables, especially relation by age and pre-relation by certificate, we got the 
right sign and the model fit improved, indicating the importance of pre-relation coupled with 
either of the other two reputation variables. This could mean that pre-relation was the 
necessary condition, while either age or certificate would suffice to minimize the cost of 
contracting.         
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Table VIII: Determinants of contract type 
VARIABLES 
MODELS 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
CONSTANT 0.22 0.15 0.07 0.26 0.07 0.3 0.21 
UNCRETAINTY 1.67 1.30** 1.54** 1.41 1.55** 1.49** 1.45** 
COMPLXITY 1.14 2.93* 3.02* 1.90* 2.14** 3.10* 3.15* 
MAN HOUR 1.22 -0.21 -0.15 1.32 -0.22** -0.26 0.08 
PRE-RELATION 1.53 - 1.57** - - - - 
YEAR 2.66** - - 3.11* - - - 
CETRIFICATE 1.17 - - - 1.1 - - 
RELATION*YEAR - - - - - -2.24 - 
RELATION* CETRIFI CATE - - - - -  -2.49 
-2LL 33.74 45.83 41.8 36.07 39.46 43.84 43.41 
CS R
2 
0.49 0.35 0.4 0.47 0.43 0.38 0.38 
*  significant at the 0.05 level or better. 
**  significant at the 0.10 level. 
-2LL is -2 Log likelihood 
CS R
2
 is Cox & Snell R
2    
The results of the model that include all reputation variables and project characteristics in 
determining contract type are not statistically significant. But when introduced individually in 
the model given project characteristics reputation seems to influence the type of the contract 
that the firm gets. Firms that are old (age), with certification and pre-relation are 22 times, 12 
times and 5 times more likely to get T&M contract comparing to non-reputed firms 
respectively. On the contrary to the models of contract complexity determinants, here when 
the interactive terms of reputation variables are introduced, there is no notable improvement 
in the model fit.   
IV 
Conclusion: 
We aimed to empirically test the determining factors of contract design governing inter-firm 
relations. The results fairly support the propositions put forward at the outset. The issue was 
to comprehend the determinants of the type of contracts or level of contract complexity. We 
posited that highly uncertain, complex projects with huge asset specific investment would be 
protected by more complex contracts. Cross tabulation results confirm that projects with high 
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complexity, uncertainty and man-hour sunk in the relation tend to get more complex 
contracts.  
Writing complex contract is costly and notoriously inflexible to unexpected future 
contingencies. We presumed that firms would try to economize on costly contracting. The 
other dimension of the problem is to decide upon the type of remuneration, which could be 
used to incentivize the agent and check unscrupulous behavior. Time-and-Material (T&M) 
contracts incentivize the agent but expose the client to the perils of hold-ups. Good reputation 
could be a solution to both the problems discussed above. Firms with high reputation in the 
sample tend to economize on writing a stringent, complex contract and get T&M contracts 
that insure the supplier against risk.  
The results confirm the significance of all the reputation variables in influencing contract 
design, but the relative importance of reputation measures is not clear from the sample. It 
indicates that even without quality certification a firm can economize on cost of contracting 
and get T&M contract if it has long understanding with its clients and vice versa. These 
measures appear to work together. Pre-Relation seem to have taller effects along with either 
of the other two variables indicating its importance in outsourcing relations. The significance 
of pre-relation interactive with the other two reputational variables indicate that it might be a 
necessary condition for economizing on complex contracting and get a better propertied 
contract such as T&M. Along with Pre-Relation both Age and Certification manifest 
themselves to be significant. This indicates that Age and Certification are the sufficient 
condition for economizing on contracting and get a T&M contract.  
However, our study has not looked into the learning aspect of IS outsourcing relationships. 
The firms in the sample get projects where they have proven expertise and learning 
possibilities are fewer. When a relationship involves new learning i.e. dissemination of new 
technological knowledge and tacit transactional knowledge, the problem becomes even more 
complicated and the need for more well specified contracts to direct the course of action and 
the importance of reputation generation increases tremendously. A study of wider scope that 
includes firms, which execute even hi-end projects, would be more appropriate to look into 
the learning aspect of the relation.
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